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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Marquise Bell challenges two enhancements to his 
sentence for robbing a Metro PCS store – one for the use of a 
dangerous weapon and the other for physically restraining the 
victim.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 
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District Court’s application of the enhancement for use of a 
dangerous weapon, reverse its application for physically 
restraining the victim, and remand for resentencing.   
I. Background 
 On September 15, 2015, Bell and Samuel Robinson 
entered a Metro PCS store located at 4229 North Broad Street, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Both men wore stockings over 
their faces to obscure their identities.  Bell carried a weapon 
resembling a firearm.  Upon entering the store, Bell physically 
confronted a store employee, by grabbing the employee’s neck, 
pointing the weapon at his neck, and throwing the employee to 
the ground.  Bell then began to remove cash from the register.  
The employee attempted to stop the theft by grabbing Bell’s 
arm, causing Bell to strike the employee with the weapon.  The 
blow caused a piece of the weapon to break off, at which time 
the employee realized the firearm was fake. The firearm Bell 
carried was, in reality, a plastic gun.  The employee then stood 
up and attempted to stop the robbery.  There was a struggle 
during which Bell pushed the employee away, allowing him 
and Robinson to flee the store with approximately $1,000.00 
in cash.    
 During the sentencing hearing, Bell’s counsel read a 
statement from the employee describing the incident: 
 “I grabbed his arm.  He hit me with the gun. 
That’s when I knew it was fake.  It was plastic.  
It broke and part of it fell over here (pointing to 
the floor) behind the register. That’s when I saw 
the piece on the floor. I got up again, to fight him, 
but he grabbed the money from the register and 
ran out the door.” 
 4 
 
(App. A50-51.)  
 During his flight, Bell dropped his hat, which was 
seized by the Philadelphia Police and preserved for DNA 
testing.  Approximately one year later, the police obtained a 
warrant for Bell’s DNA.  When FBI agents, Task Force 
officers, and Philadelphia Police Officers went to Bell’s 
residence to execute the warrant, they found Bell hiding on the 
roof outside his bedroom window.  Near Bell, the officers saw 
a plastic bag, from which a cardboard box marked 
“Winchester” protruded.  The bag contained multiple rounds 
of various types, calibers, and makes of ammunition.   
 Bell was indicted in two separate one count indictments 
– one for being a felon in possession of ammunition in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the second for Hobbs Act 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  He pled guilty to 
both indictments.   
 At sentencing, the District Court, over Bell’s counsel’s 
objections, imposed a two-level enhancement for physical 
restraint pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and a four-
level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).1  After a three-level reduction for 
                                                 
 1 Counsel also sought to have the offenses grouped in 
order to eliminate an additional one level enhancement.  In 
addition, counsel sought a reduction for Bell’s minor role in 
the offense.  The District Court rejected both of these 
arguments.  Bell does not challenge either of those decisions 
on appeal.   
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acceptance of responsibility, the District Court concluded that 
Bell had an offense level of 24 and a criminal history category 
of IV, resulting in a sentencing range of 77 to 96 months.  After 
considering the § 3553 factors, the Court imposed a sentence 
of 86 months of incarceration, followed by three years of 
supervised release.  This timely appeal followed.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of 
review to use in this case.  Citing no cases, Bell asserts that we 
should apply de novo review to his challenges to the 
application of the sentencing enhancements.  Relying on 
United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), the 
government posits that we should review for clear error.  This 
misconstrues our holding in Richards.    
 As we stated in United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), “this Court will continue to 
review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear 
error and to exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines.”  We did just that in Richards; 
we were not required to interpret the Guidelines because the 
appellant did “not quarrel with the District Court’s articulation 
of what it means to be a government official in a high-level 
decision-making or sensitive position, for the District Court 
used the definition of the enhancement exactly as it is recited 
in the Guidelines.”  Richards, 674 F.3d at 218.  Instead, the 
appellant “disagree[d] with the District Court’s conclusion that 
the facts regarding his employment fit within the Guidelines 
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definition of a government official in a high-level decision-
making or sensitive position.”  Id.  We, therefore, applied clear 
error review to the District Court’s factual findings.   
 Despite the government’s assertion that we are currently 
faced with a situation similar to that in Richards, we are not.  
Bell has not contested the facts of his offense.  Instead, he 
challenges the District Court’s interpretation and application of 
two provisions of the Guidelines.2  We will review the District 
                                                 
 2 In concluding that we should review the District 
Court’s decision for clear error, our dissenting colleague 
focuses on the factual nature of the application of the 
Guideline, but fails to acknowledge that we have not, prior to 
today’s decision, provided a comprehensive interpretation of 
the physical restraint enhancement that a district court could 
then apply.  The fatal flaw in the dissent’s interpretation of 
Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), emanates from a 
lack of appreciation for the distinction the Supreme Court is 
drawing.  Here, as recognized in Buford, we are considering “a 
generally recurring, purely legal matter, such as interpreting a 
set of legal words, say, those of an individual guideline, in 
order to determine their basic intent.”  Id. at 65.  We are not 
addressing an issue that “is bounded by[ ] case-specific 
detailed factual circumstances [where] the fact-bound nature of 
the decision limits the value of appellate court precedent, 
which may provide only minimal help when other courts 
consider other procedural circumstances, other state systems, 
and other crimes.”  Id.at 65-66.  Just last year, we, as an en 
banc court, applied these principles when we exercised plenary 
review over the interpretation of a specific guideline.  United 
States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc).  
We are now interpreting the meaning of sections 
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Court’s determinations de novo.  See United States v. Paul, 904 
F.3d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he issue on this appeal is not 
the factual question of what happened to the store employee; it 
is the legal question whether the physical restraint 
enhancement applies to the undisputed facts . . . .”); United 
States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
pertinent facts . . . are not disputed. . . . The question is whether 
the physical restraint enhancement applies to those facts, an 
issue that ‘turns primarily on the legal interpretation of a 
guideline term.’” (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 
504, 507 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
III.  Analysis 
 On appeal, Bell raises two challenges to his sentence.  
The first – whether he physically restrained the victim – 
requires us to review sections 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 1B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines in order to discern what conduct the 
Sentencing Commission sought to encompass in the definition 
of “physically restrained.”  The second – whether Bell used a 
dangerous weapon – presents a less challenging analysis in 
light of our clear precedent on this issue.  
 A. Physically restrained  
 Consideration of the enhancement for physical restraint 
involves two sections of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Section 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) provides that “if any person was physically 
restrained to facilitate commission of the offense [of robbery] 
or to facilitate escape,” the sentencing calculation should be 
                                                 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 1B1.1, before applying that meaning to the 
present case.     
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increased by two levels.  “Physically restrained” is defined in 
the application notes to § 1B1.1 as “mean[ing] the forcible 
restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked 
up.”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(K) 
(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016) [hereinafter “U.S.S.G.”].3   
 Looking only at the language used in the definition, it 
would appear clear that Bell did not physically restrain the 
store employee because he did not tie up, bind, or lock up the 
employee.  However, we, along with many of our sister 
circuits, have held that the three examples provided in the 
definition of physically restrained are not an exhaustive list, 
but rather only examples of the types of conduct that fall within 
the meaning of the term. United States v. Copenhaver, 185 
F.3d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Cases have generally held that 
‘physical restraint’ is not limited to the examples listed in the 
guidelines.”).  See, e.g., United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 
(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. 
                                                 
 3 At the time of Bell’s sentencing in 2017, the term 
“physically restrained” was defined in Application Note 1(K) 
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. As a result of revisions 
made to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in 2018, the definition 
of “physically restrained” now appears in Application Note 
1(L). This change does not affect our case. See Dorsey v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 260, 275 (2012) (“The Sentencing 
Commission has . . . instructed sentencing judges to ‘use the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 
sentenced,’ regardless of when the defendant committed the 
offense, unless doing so ‘would violate the ex post facto 
clause.’” (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11)).   
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Cir. 2000); United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 
1999); United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461 (5th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 
1989).   
 Since our decision in Copenhaver, we have not had the 
occasion to speak precedentially on the parameters of what it 
means to be physically restrained, as defined in the Guidelines.  
Copenhaver involved the defendant, during the course of a 
robbery, forcing the victim from one room into another and 
then “put[ting] him in the fireplace and plac[ing] the fire screen 
across it.”  Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 179 (quoting the 
appendix).  While we discussed, in dicta, factors other circuits 
had considered when imposing the enhancement for physically 
restraining a victim, we were not required to adopt any specific 
test to be used in interpreting this Guideline since  
[w]e need not choose in this case between the 
position of [United States v.] Thompson[, 109 
F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1997),] that forcing some 
action at the point of a gun constitutes physical 
restraint under the Guideline and that in [United 
States v.] Anglin[, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999),] 
holding to the contrary.  Here, Copenhaver did 
more than merely order Helwig to stand still, 
kneel or lie down.  He not only forced him into 
another office but put him into the fireplace and 
placed the fire screen across it, thereby confining 
his victim in a manner comparable to the 
example given in Anglin of ‘locking up’ the 
victim. 
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Id. at182.  We are now faced with a less clear situation that 
requires us to determine what factors to consider when 
determining if a defendant physically restrained a victim.   
 Unlike our Court, over the past twenty years, other 
circuits have reviewed the meaning and application of the 
physically restrained enhancement.  Turning to those cases, we 
discern five broad factors that the other circuits have used to 
evaluate whether the enhancement should be applied and that 
we, after consideration, adopt here.  Those factors are  
1. Use of physical force; 
2. Exerting control over the victim; 
3.  Providing the victim with no alternative 
but compliance;  
4. Focusing on the victim for some period of 
time; and 
5. Placement in a confined space. 
 We emphasize that courts should balance these factors 
in deciding whether to impose the enhancement; no single 
factor is necessarily dispositive.   
 1.  Use of physical force 
 Several circuits have commented on the relevance of the 
term “physical” in the definition of physically restrained.  As 
the D.C. Circuit succinctly stated, “[t]he required restraint 
must, as the language plainly recites, be physical.”  United 
States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  That Court 
further observed that “the phrase ‘being tied, bound, or locked 
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up’ indicates that physical restraint requires the defendant 
either to restrain the victim through bodily contact or to confine 
the victim in some way.”  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
D.C. Circuit relied upon the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Anglin.  Id. (noting that “[t]he most pertinent definition of 
‘physical’ is ‘of the body as opposed to the mind, as, physical 
exercise.’” (quoting Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164)).   
 In Anglin, the Second Circuit relied on “the plain 
meaning of words” to support its conclusion that the physical 
restraint enhancement requires the use of physical force.  
Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164.  Observing that “‘physical’ is an 
adjective which modifies (and hence limits) the noun 
‘restraint,’” the Second Circuit reasoned that “if § 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) said only that the enhancement would apply ‘if 
any person was restrained,’ the courts would become involved 
in mental, moral, philosophical, even theological 
considerations, in addition to physical ones. No, the restraint 
must be ‘physical.’”  Id.   
 The Fifth Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning – it too requires the use of physical, rather than 
mental or moral, force in order to apply the enhancement.  
United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017).  
There, the Fifth Circuit concluded that although “we have little 
doubt that at least one of the employees felt restrained when 
the barrel of a gun touched the back of his neck, . . .  this 
employee and his coworkers were not subjected to the type of 
physical restraint that victims experience when they are tied, 
bound, or locked up.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the need “for 
something that tells us on which side of the line that divides 
psychological coercion from physical restraint a given case 
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falls.”  United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 
2019).  Specifically, that Court sought to resolve “the question 
whether the physical-restraint enhancement can be applied to 
situations in which an armed defendant simply orders his 
victims not to move and does not otherwise immobilize them 
through measures such as those outlined in the commentary to 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.”  Id. at 874.  In that context – where a 
defendant points a gun at a victim – the Seventh Circuit 
observed that  
the victim’s reaction does not determine whether 
there is or is not physical restraint.  If the 
defendant waves a gun around and barks out a 
command to stay still and the victim obeys, it 
makes no sense to say that the recipient of the 
order was physically restrained.  Whatever 
restraint occurred came about from the way the 
victim decided to respond to the order.  She 
might obey; she might ignore it; or she might 
attempt to flee.  Her physical response to the 
defendant’s attempt to coerce, however, is not 
something that logically belongs within the 
scope of the physical-restraint guideline. 
Id. at 876.  Ultimately, the Court “align[ed] [itself] with the 
circuits that have found that more than pointing a gun at 
someone and ordering that person not to move is necessary for 
the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).”  Id. at 877.   
 We discern a common thread in these cases regarding 
the meaning of “physical” in the definition of physical 
restraint:  the need for the restraint to be something more than 
a psychological restraint.  We agree that we should consider 
the plain meaning of the word “physical” in the definition set 
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forth in § 1B1.1, and we therefore adopt the requirement that 
the restraint involve some physical aspect.   
 2.  Exerting control over the victim  
 Continuing our focus on the plain language of the 
Guidelines, we turn to the second word in the phrase:  
“restrained.”  Anglin, once again, provides us with guidance on 
this point.  Citing Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, 
the Second Circuit examined the definition of “the verb 
‘restrain,’ whose first definition is ‘to hold back; to check; to 
hold from action, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical 
or moral force, or by any interposing obstacle.’”  Anglin, 169 
F.3d at 164 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Webster’s Deluxe 
Unabridged Dictionary (1979) at 1544).  Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit has turned to the dictionary in an effort to discern the 
meaning of the enhancement.  United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 
1444, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The dictionary defines ‘restraint’ 
as (1) the act of holding back from some activity or (2) by 
means of force, an act that checks free activity or otherwise 
controls.” (citing Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1937 (1986))).  The Fourth Circuit has also 
recognized that the enhancement requires some form of 
restraint, stating “[t]he intended scope of the USSG 
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement is to punish a defendant who 
deprives a person of his physical movement.”  United States v. 
Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 We agree that, in order to impose the enhancement, a 
defendant should be deemed to have engaged in actions that 
restrict a victim’s freedom of movement in some manner.  
Requiring a restriction of a victim’s freedom of movement is 
consistent not only with the dictionary definition of restraint, 
but also with the examples of “being tied, bound or locked up” 
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provided in the Guidelines.  All three of those examples restrict 
a victim’s freedom of movement.  While tying and binding a 
victim require touching the person, it is possible to lock 
someone up without touching them.  In addition, a defendant 
could direct one victim to tie up another victim, an action that 
would not require the defendant to touch the victim, but would 
clearly fall within the specific examples set forth in the 
Guidelines.  We therefore reiterate our statement in 
Copenhaver that “[n]o actual touching is required to effect 
physical restraint.”  185 F.3d at 182.  
 3.  Providing the victim with no alternative but 
compliance 
 As we observed in Copenhaver, application of the 
enhancement for “physically restrained” is appropriate “when 
the defendant ‘creates circumstances allowing the persons no 
alternative but compliance.’”  Id. at 180 (quoting United States 
v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993)).  The Second, 
Seventh,4 Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all similarly 
recognized that providing a victim with no alternative but 
                                                 
 4 Earlier this year, the Seventh Circuit noted that some 
of its cases had extended the concept of “no alternative to 
compliance” from physical into psychological restraints.  
Herman, 930 F.3d at 876-77.  In light of that concern, the Court 
noted that “[t]o the extent that those earlier cases allow for the 
application of the ‘physical restraint’ enhancement based 
solely on psychological coercion—including the coercion of 
being held at gun point—we hereby disapprove those 
holdings.”  Id. at 877. 
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compliance plays a role in determining whether to apply the 
enhancement.   
 For example, in United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319 (2d 
Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit affirmed application of the 
enhancement because the defendant, “[b]y standing on his 
victim’s throat while committing the robbery, . . . facilitated 
the commission of the offense in that the victim ‘could do 
nothing about [his] situation because of the physical restraint.’”  
7 F.3d at 321 (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 
347 (7th Cir. 1992) abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87(1993)). 
 In United States v. Victor, the Eleventh Circuit noted 
that the enhancement is applicable when the defendant’s 
conduct “ensure[s] the victims’ compliance and effectively 
prevent[s] them from leaving.”  719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 
2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518–19 
(11th Cir. 1994)).  The court in Victor concluded that by 
threatening the victim with what the victim believed was a gun 
and thereby preventing the victim from escaping, the defendant 
physically restrained her within the meaning of the 
enhancement.  Id. (mentioning that the victim was “forced to 
comply”).  
 In Kirtley, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although 
the defendant himself did not bind the victims, he ordered them 
to bind themselves at gun point and therefore, because the 
victims had “no alternative but to obey,” the defendant 
physically restrained them.  986 F.2d at 286 (“a defendant 
physically restrains persons if the defendant creates 
circumstances allowing the persons no alternative but 
compliance.”).  Similarly, in United States v. Lee, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed application of the sentencing enhancement on 
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the ground that the defendant physically restrained the victim 
by striking her with a gun, thereby “creat[ing] circumstances 
allowing the [woman] no alternative but compliance.”  570 
F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kirtley, 986 F.2d at 286) 
(alteration in original); see also United States v. Schau, 1 F.3d 
729, 730 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that application of the 
enhancement was warranted where the defendant ordered the 
victims into an unlocked vault from which they could easily 
have freed themselves on the ground that the victims were 
forced to comply).  
 We agree that, in order to impose the enhancement for 
physical restraint, a defendant’s actions should leave a victim 
with no alternative but compliance.5  While we commented on 
this factor in dicta in Copenhaver, we now formally adopt it as 
a factor to consider when imposing the enhancement.  
  
                                                 
 5 In Herman, the Seventh Circuit observed that “[t]he 
phrase ‘operation of circumstances that permit no alternative 
to compliance’ could be understood to cover purely 
psychological coercion.”  Herman, 930 F.3d at 876.  As we 
have already stated, we believe that physical, not 
psychological, restraint is required in order to impose the 
enhancement.  Our inclusion of a victim having no alternative 
but compliance as a factor to consider in the physical restraint 
analysis does not erase the need for the restraint to be physical, 
nor does it open the door for psychological restraints to be 
considered.   
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 4.  Focusing on the victim for some period of time 
 The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have recognized a need 
to consider the duration of the restraint in imposing the 
enhancement.  The Fourth Circuit distinguished between 
situations where the victims were “confined to a room for some 
time” or “held and threatened for a long enough period to 
accomplish the cash withdrawal,” and the brief amount of time 
the defendant held his victim during the stabbing at issue in the 
case before it.  United States v. Mikalajunas, 936 F.2d 153, 156 
(4th Cir. 1991).  The Court concluded that “the examples of 
physical restraint in the guidelines, while not all inclusive, 
imply that the guidelines intend an enhancement for something 
other than a brief holding as part of a stabbing.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “in 
determining whether the physical restraint enhancement was 
properly applied we should examine the nature and duration of 
the restraint.”  United States v. Khleang, 3 F. App’x 672, 675 
(10th Cir. 2001).6   
 The consideration of duration of the physical restraint 
echoes the requirement for “sustained focus on the restrained 
person that lasts long enough for the robber to direct the victim 
into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere” identified 
by the Ninth Circuit.  United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Court further opined that “[i]t is 
therefore likely that Congress meant for something more than 
briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding her once to 
get down to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all 
                                                 
 6 The Tenth Circuit allows citation to unpublished 
opinions as persuasive, but not precedential, authority.  10th 
Cir. R. 32.1.   
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armed bank robberies will presumably involve such acts.”  Id. 
at 1118–19; see also United States v. Albritton, 622 F.3d 1104, 
1107–08 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the sustained focus 
requirement was met where the defendant directed the victim 
around the premises and followed right behind her with a gun 
in his hand).   
 We note that the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. 
Coleman, rejected the “sustained focus” standard that was 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Parker.  664 F.3d 1047, 1050 
(6th Cir. 2012) (“No other circuit has adopted Parker’s view, 
and our reading aligns with those circuits that read the text 
more broadly.”).  However, the Sixth Circuit noted that even if 
it did adopt Parker’s “sustained focus” requirement, the 
defendant’s conduct would still warrant imposition of the 
enhancement because, by forcing the victim to go to a different 
place and stay there, the defendant’s focus lasted long enough 
to satisfy Parker’s sustained focus standard.  Id. at 1050–51. 
 We agree with those courts that have identified a 
durational requirement in order to impose the enhancement.  
As the Fourth Circuit aptly noted, all of the examples of 
physical restraint listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 – being tied, 
bound, or locked up – imply more than a momentary restraint.  
As such, we shall include duration of the restraint as a factor in 
our analysis determining application of the enhancement.7   
                                                 
 7 Our dissenting colleague believes that “the physical 
restraint need only last long enough ‘to facilitate the 
commission of the offense or facilitate escape.’”  Dissent at 11 
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)).  He finds that the few 
seconds the employee was on the ground facilitated the 
commission of the robbery because “Bell was able to grab 
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 5.  Placement in a confined space 
 In Copenhaver, we examined this concept and 
concluded that “[i]t is the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or 
confining the victim in a space or with a barrier, actual or 
threatened, that constitutes the action meriting enhancement of 
the offense level.”  185 F.3d at 183.  The inclusion of this factor 
is helpful to our jurisprudence.  We include it here to formalize 
its relevance in determining the appropriate application of the 
enhancement.     
 In sum, we conclude that, in order to impose the 
enhancement for physical restraint, a district court should 
determine if the defendant’s actions involved the use of 
physical force that limited the victim’s freedom of movement, 
                                                 
money out of the cash register after shoving the employee to 
the ground.”  Id.  We simply cannot agree that the few seconds 
during which the employee was on the floor allowed Bell to 
commit the robbery in the same way being tied, bound, or 
locked up would.  The examples provided in the Guidelines 
imply the restraint has to last for some period of time greater 
than a few seconds.   
 If we were to use the Dissent’s standard of the restraint 
lasting only long enough to facilitate the commission of the 
offense or facilitate escape, then we would be compelled to 
impose the enhancement based on Bell pushing the employee 
away during their struggle since that push was physical and it 
allowed Bell to escape.  We simply cannot agree that such a 
brief encounter is what the Guidelines contemplate.   
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with a sustained focus on the victim for some period of time 
which provided the victim with no alternative but compliance.  
No single factor is dispositive nor does any factor carry more 
weight than any other factor; rather, district courts should 
balance all of these factors.  Further, as stated in Section 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the restraint must be imposed “to facilitate 
commission of the offense [of robbery] or to facilitate escape.”  
 The Parties’ Arguments 
 With these factors in mind, we turn to the parties’ 
arguments. 
 Relying on Anglin and Rosario, Bell argues that “more 
than a mere threat is required to establish physical restraint.”  
Appellant’s Br. 10.  He asserts, in conclusory fashion, that 
“pushing someone to the floor, and threatening them with what 
apparently is a toy gun is not inherently ‘physical restraint.’”  
Appellant’s Br. 12.  Bell, in his reply brief, posits that if the 
enhancement is applied here, “then arguably all robberies 
justify the 2-level enhancement.” Reply Br. 1.   
 On the other hand, the government engages in a 
thorough discussion of the cases interpreting physical restraint, 
concluding that “[h]olding the weapon to the victim’s neck and 
throwing him to the floor achieved the same objective as 
various other forms of physical restraint – namely, it confined 
the victim to the floor, permitting the defendant to access the 
cash register and steal cash.”  Appellee’s Br. 22.  The 
government notes that Bell’s conduct encompassed more than 
simply pointing a gun at a victim since “Bell used direct 
physical contact to put the victim on the floor and attempt to 
confine him to that space.”  Appellee’s Br. 23.  The 
government also emphasizes that Bell “did not simply brandish 
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the fake gun, but placed the gun to the victim’s neck and threw 
him on the ground, and then struck the victim with the gun in 
an effort to keep the victim from intervening.”  Id.  Analogizing 
to the fact in Copenhaver that the fire screen placed across the 
fireplace was removable, the government claims that the fact 
“the victim persisted in his efforts to thwart the robbery once 
he realized the firearm was fake is of no moment.”  Id.  Rather, 
the important fact, in the government’s view, “was the act of 
forcing the victim to the ground and attempting to hold him 
there.”  Id.   
 Despite the government’s efforts to demonstrate Bell 
physically restrained his victim, we disagree.  While grabbing 
the victim by the neck and forcing him to the floor satisfies the 
requirement that the force be physical, we cannot say that the 
victim was left with no alternative but compliance (a point the 
government never addresses) since the victim twice attempted 
to thwart the robbery.8  Further, the physical restraint was quite 
                                                 
 8 While the Dissent observes “that the focus is ‘on the 
action of the defendant, not on the reaction of the victim,’” 
Dissent at 10 (quoting Herman, 930 F.3d at 876), we are not 
focusing on the employee’s reaction.  Rather, we are 
considering the result of Bell’s action of grabbing the 
employee’s neck and shoving him to the floor.  Since the 
employee was clearly able to move, as evidenced by his 
attempt to thwart the robbery, we cannot say he was restrained.  
Further, in commenting that “the enhancement aims to punish 
the act of physical restraint, successful or not,” Dissent at 9, the 
Dissent misstates our precedent in Copenhaver.  Nowhere in 
Copenhaver do we state that only an attempt at physically 
restraining a victim will suffice to impose the enhancement, 
nor do the Guidelines indicate that attempted restraint is a basis 
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limited in time.  It could not have taken more than a few 
seconds for Bell to grab the victim’s neck and shove him to the 
floor.  Thus, there was no sustained focus on the victim.  
Instead, based on the victim’s description of the incident, the 
entire interaction between him and Bell seems to have taken 
only seconds from start to finish.  Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that Bell physically 
restrained his victim sufficiently to invoke application of the 
enhancement.  If we apply the enhancement here, then any 
crime that involves a chance encounter with a victim with any 
physical dimension would require application of the 
enhancement.   
 B. Use of a dangerous weapon 
Bell argues that he “brandished,” rather than “otherwise used” 
a dangerous weapon under Application Notes 1(C) and 1(I) to 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, and that he therefore should not be subject 
to the four-level use of a dangerous weapon enhancement of 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).  
The Sentencing Guidelines define the above terms as follows: 
“Brandished” with reference to a dangerous 
weapon (including a firearm) means that all or 
part of the weapon was displayed, or the 
presence of the weapon was otherwise made 
                                                 
for imposing the enhancement.  In Copenhaver, we 
acknowledged, based on the flimsy nature of the fireplace 
screen, that a barrier enclosing a victim could be “actual or 
threatened,” 185 F.3d at 183, but we did not extend that 
concept to conclude the physical restraint need not succeed.     
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known to another person, in order to intimidate 
that person, regardless of whether the weapon 
was directly visible to that person. Accordingly, 
although the dangerous weapon does not have to 
be directly visible, the weapon must be present. 
“Otherwise used” with reference to a dangerous 
weapon (including a firearm) means that the 
conduct did not amount to the discharge of a 
firearm but was more than brandishing, 
displaying, or possessing a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon. 
 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. 1(C) & 1(I). 
 
 We established a distinction between brandishing and 
otherwise using a weapon in United States v. Johnson, 199 
F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. 
LaFortune, 192 F.3d 157, 161-62 (1st Cir. 1999) (alterations 
in original)):  
[A] person may “brandish” a weapon to “advise” 
those concerned that he possesses the general 
ability to do violence, and that violence is 
imminently or immediately available . . . . 
Altering this general display of weaponry by [for 
instance] specifically leveling a cocked firearm 
at the head or body of a bank teller or customer, 
ordering them to move or be quiet according to 
one’s direction, is a cessation of “brandishing” 
and the commencement of “otherwise used.” 
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Bell pointed a weapon at the store employee’s neck, ordered 
him to the ground, and then struck him with the weapon.  
(P.S.R. ¶ 9.)  This behavior clearly goes beyond the parameters 
we set in Johnson for determining the limits of brandishing a 
weapon.  199 F.3d at 127.  
 Furthermore, in United States v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 145 
(3d Cir. 2002), we stated that “[n]either the guidelines nor the 
caselaw requires infliction of the violent physical contact . . . 
or a verbalized threat to harm the victim in order to constitute 
‘otherwise used.’”  We held in Orr that “pointing a gun at the 
head of the assistant manager and ordering her to empty money 
into a garbage bag was a ‘specific threat’ directed at her and 
was precisely the type of conduct which satisfies the ‘otherwise 
used’ requirement.”  Id.  If “otherwise using” a weapon does 
not require even physical contact or a specific verbal threat of 
harm, it does not follow that actually striking someone with a 
weapon would not constitute use. 
 Bell argues that his actions do not constitute otherwise 
using a firearm under Johnson because the firearm he used was 
fake.  This argument is inapposite.  The Sentencing Guidelines 
allow for a four-level increase if a dangerous weapon was 
otherwise used.  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).  The Guidelines 
then define an object as a dangerous weapon if it is  
(i) an instrument capable of inflicting death or 
serious bodily injury; or (ii) an object that is not 
an instrument capable of inflicting death or 
serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles 
such an instrument; or (II) the defendant used the 
object in a manner that created the impression 
that the object was such an instrument (e.g.[,] a 
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defendant wrapped a hand in a towel during a 
bank robbery to create the appearance of a gun). 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(D).  In Orr, we held that this 
definition applies to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D):  “Application Note 1(d) 
of § 1B1.1 clearly instructs that objects that appear to be 
dangerous weapons shall be considered dangerous weapons for 
purposes of § 2B3.1.” 312 F.3d at 144.  
 Bell carried a toy gun, which he pointed at the victim’s 
neck.  Bell then forced the employee to the floor and ultimately 
struck him with the weapon.  The victim did not realize that the 
firearm was fake until after he was struck with it.  These factors 
indicate that Bell’s actions meet our standards for otherwise 
using a dangerous weapon.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s imposition 
of the enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon, 
reverse the imposition of the enhancement for physically 
restraining the victim, and remand for resentencing, consistent 
with this opinion.   
  
United States v. Bell 
No. 17-3792 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
I write separately because I believe that the proper 
standard of review regarding application of the two United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) 
enhancements at issue is clear error, not de novo, as my learned 
colleagues hold.  Further, although I ultimately agree with the 
majority regarding the application of the enhancement for use 
of a dangerous weapon, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), I disagree 
with its disposition of Bell’s appeal on the physical restraint 
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).   
 
I. 
 
 In United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007), 
our en banc Court held that we “review factual findings 
relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and . . . exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the 
Guidelines.”  Id. at 570.  But Bell does not challenge the 
sentencing court’s factual findings or its interpretation of the 
Guidelines.  He challenges instead its determination that two 
of the Guidelines enhancements apply to his case.  And Grier 
did not provide the standard pertinent to reviewing the 
application of an enhancement. 
 
   Bell contends that de novo review is appropriate, while 
the Government contends that we should review for clear error, 
citing our decision in United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 
(3d Cir. 2012).  My colleagues quickly distinguish Richards, 
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the holding of which they believe the Government has 
misconstrued.  I disagree with the majority’s conclusion. 
 
Before delving into a discussion of Richards, I address 
two notable authorities cited in that opinion.  First, we cited 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e), which sets forth principles to be applied by 
courts of appeals in reviewing sentences.  Richards, 674 F.3d 
at 219 n.2.  The statute provides that courts of appeals “shall 
give due deference to the district court’s application of the 
guidelines to the facts.”  § 3742(e).  
  
Second, we cited the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
decision in Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), which 
in turn, relied upon § 3742(e).  Richards, 674 F.3d at 219–20 
& n.2.  That case involved review of whether Buford’s prior 
convictions were “related” under the Guidelines and whether 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in reviewing 
a district court’s sentence under a deferential clear error 
standard of review.  Buford, 532 U.S. at 60–61; see also United 
States v. Buford, 201 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 
U.S. 59 (2001).  Acknowledging the command of § 3742(e), 
the Supreme Court framed the question as “what kind of 
‘deference’ is ‘due’” to district courts applying the Guidelines 
to facts.  532 U.S. at 63.  The Court noted that the answer to 
that question “depends on the nature of the question 
presented.”  Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
98 (1996)).  It distinguished between “a generally recurring, 
purely legal matter, such as interpreting a set of legal words . . 
. readily resolved by reference to general legal principles and 
standards alone,” and a question that “grows out of, and is 
bounded by, case-specific detailed factual circumstances.”  Id. 
at 65.  The Court held that the latter type of question — one of 
a “fact-bound nature” — required deference when reviewing 
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the district court’s application of a Guideline.  Id. at 66.  
Deferential review of a fact-bound application by a district 
court was appropriate, the Court reasoned, because of the 
“institutional advantages enjoyed by the district court,” id. at 
64, including “the comparatively greater expertise of the 
District Court,” id. at 66, resulting from the volume of 
sentencings trial judges conduct.  In addition, the Court 
reasoned that “the fact-bound nature of the decision limits the 
value of appellate court precedent, which may provide only 
minimal help when other courts consider other . . . 
circumstances.”  Id. at 65–66.  The Court concluded that the 
question before it was fact bound and that “the appellate court 
was right to review this trial court decision deferentially rather 
than de novo.”  Id. at 64, 66.1     
 
In Richards, we were asked to review an application of 
U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2(b)(3), an enhancement that increases an 
offense level when the crime involves a “public official in a 
high-level decision-making or sensitive position.”  674 F.3d at 
217 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2(b)(3)).  The defendant argued 
that application of the enhancement necessarily “involve[d] an 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines,” warranting de 
                                              
1 Even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Buford, 
we held in United States v. Ortiz that where application of a 
Guideline was “essentially factual,” we would employ a clearly 
erroneous standard of review.  878 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 
1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 
1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).  In Ortiz, “we conclude[d] that 
the question of a defendant’s aggravating role . . . is ‘essentially 
factual’” and determined that we would “reverse the district 
court in th[at] case only if its conclusion [were] clearly 
erroneous.”  Id. at 127.    
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novo review.  Id. at 218.  We determined instead — relying 
upon Buford — that clear error review was appropriate.2  We 
reached this determination because Richards was not 
challenging “the District Court’s articulation of what it means 
to be a government official in a high-level decision-making or 
sensitive position, for the District Court used the definition of 
the enhancement exactly as it is recited in the Guidelines,” but 
rather its “conclusion that the facts . . . fit within the Guidelines 
definition of a government official in a high-level decision-
making or sensitive position.”  Id.  We then held that when 
“sentencing adjustments require a district court to closely 
examine a set of facts and determine whether they fit within 
the definition of the adjustment before deciding whether to 
apply the adjustment, we should review that decision for clear 
error only.”  Id. at 222.  For instance, we concluded, “where, 
as here, the particular Guideline in question sets forth a 
predominantly fact-driven test,” we review for clear error.  Id. 
at 223; see also United States v. Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (holding that “[w]e . . . review the District Court’s 
application of the relocation enhancement for clear error” 
because the question “is, at bottom, ‘a strictly factual test, such 
that once the test is stated[,] no legal reasoning is necessary to 
the resolution of the issue’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Richards, 674 F.3d at 221)).  
   
Here, we too “consider a district court’s application of 
the Guidelines to a specific set of facts.”  Richards, 674 F.3d at 
                                              
2 We recognized in Richards that although the Supreme 
Court excised certain parts of § 3742(e) in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that statute “still call[s] for ‘due 
deference’ to be given to a district court’s application of the 
Guidelines to the facts.”  Richards, 674 F.3d at 219 n.2. 
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219.  Because application of either enhancement here 
“require[d] [the] district court to closely examine” the facts of 
Bell’s case “and determine whether they fit within the 
definition[s] of the adjustment[s] before deciding . . . to apply 
the[m], we should review th[ose] decision[s] for clear error 
only.”  Id. at 222.  Indeed, the majority’s recitation of a “fact-
driven test” to determine whether the physical restraint 
enhancement applies compels clear error review.  Id. at 223. 
   
 My colleagues distinguish Richards by noting that “Bell 
has not contested the facts of his offense” and that Bell is only 
challenging the “interpretation and application of two 
provisions of the Guidelines.”  Maj. Op. 6.  But Richards did 
not contest the facts of his offense, either — instead, he, like 
Bell, challenged the district court’s application or fit of the 
enhancement to those undisputed facts.  Richards, 674 F.3d at 
218; see also United States v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 
2013) (determining that clear error was the proper standard to 
review application of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) where “there 
[wa]s no dispute over the factual determinations but the issue 
is whether the agreed-upon set of facts fit within the 
enhancement requirements”).  Further, Buford also argued that 
no deference was appropriate where the district court was 
simply “applying a Sentencing Guidelines term to undisputed 
facts.”  Buford, 532 U.S. at 64.  The Supreme Court did not 
credit this argument and held, as described above, that it was 
the “fact-bound nature” of the district court’s application of a 
Guideline that compelled deferential review of the application.  
Id. at 66.  As a result, whether the facts are disputed or 
undisputed is immaterial to the type of deference we give to a 
district court’s application of a Guidelines enhancement.  
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I respectfully dissent because I believe that the District 
Court’s application of the enhancements in this case should be 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.  
 
II. 
 
 Applying the clear error standard of review that I 
believe is appropriate in this matter, I now consider Bell’s 
challenges to the application of sections 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) and 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) of the Guidelines.  
  
A. 
 
 The majority notes that this Court has not considered 
the parameters of “physical restraint” in a precedential opinion 
since United States v. Copenhaver, 185 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 
1999).  In that case, we declined “to adopt any specific test to 
be used in interpreting” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), as the facts 
of that case supported application of the enhancement in any 
event.  Maj. Op. 9.  
   
 I do not necessarily fault my colleagues for desiring to 
set forth a clearer standard regarding the application of 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  But I believe that this case can be 
decided using the plain text of the enhancement and our current 
jurisprudence.  Using those sources, I believe that the District 
Court was correct to apply the physical restraint enhancement.  
And I reach that same conclusion even after considering the 
factors laid out by the majority.   
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1. 
 
The language of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 
Copenhaver dictate that application of the enhancement in this 
matter was proper.  As noted by the majority, Bell’s offense 
level may be increased by two levels pursuant to the 
enhancement “if any person was physically restrained to 
facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  “Physical[] restrain[t]” as defined 
by the Guidelines, is “the forcible restraint of the victim such 
as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 
n.1(K).3  In Copenhaver, we held that application of the 
enhancement was warranted where a robber forced a victim 
from one room to another, eventually having him get into a 
fireplace and placing a screen across it.  185 F.3d at 182.  The 
robber also repeatedly threatened the victim throughout the 
encounter and earlier displayed what appeared to be a gun.  Id.  
After considering the conclusions that our sister appellate 
courts reached in other cases challenging the enhancement’s 
application, we concluded that the defendant’s actions 
warranted application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  Id. at 
181–82.  We explained that the defendant’s action of forcing 
the victim into a fireplace in another room behind a screen 
confined the victim, similar to “lock[ing] [him] up,” id. at 182 
(first alteration in original); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 
n.1(K), and that his placement of the screen “sign[aled] his 
intention to impede” the victim’s interference with the crime, 
Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 182.  We also explained that the 
defendant’s display of a weapon, repeated threats, and 
placement of the screen left the victim no alternative but to 
                                              
3 Like the majority, I cite to the Guidelines as they 
existed when Bell was sentenced.   
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comply with the demand that he get into the fireplace and 
remain there.  Id.   
 
The same is true here.  When Bell grabbed the employee 
by the neck, pointed a gun at his neck, and then shoved him to 
the floor before Bell began extracting money from the cash 
register, he used physical force to facilitate the commission of 
his crime and attempted to confine the employee to the floor.  
When the employee tried to stop Bell, Bell struck him with the 
weapon.  Bell’s use of force against the employee, like the 
screen in Copenhaver, both served as an attempt to keep the 
employee confined to the floor and signaled his intention to 
impede the employee’s interference with the crime. 
   
That the employee was not deterred by Bell’s actions 
does not, in my view, prove that Bell’s conduct lacked 
Copenhaver’s “no alternative but compliance” factor.  We 
should not permit “a victim’s boldness [to] lessen[] a 
criminal’s culpability.”  United States v. Smith, 767 F.3d 187, 
191 (3d Cir. 2014); see also id. at 188, 190 (upholding 
application of the abduction enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 
2B3.1(b)(4)(A), even though the victim “disregarded some of 
[the defendant’s] commands and ultimately escaped”).  Indeed, 
we suggested as much in Copenhaver, explaining that the 
screen’s feebleness “d[id] not negate physical restraint” 
because “[i]t is the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining 
the victim in a space or with a barrier, actual or threatened, that 
constitutes the action meriting enhancement of the offense 
level.”  185 F.3d at 182–83 (emphases added). 
 
At bottom, my reading of the enhancement, our 
precedent, and the record leads me to conclude that the District 
Court did not clearly err in enhancing Bell’s sentence by two 
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levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  To that end, I 
would affirm the District Court’s imposition of the 
enhancement. 
 
2. 
 
 I express no opinion on the appropriateness of the 
factors adopted by the majority to be balanced by sentencing 
courts when determining whether the physical restraint 
enhancement should be applied.  But assuming that these 
factors set forth an appropriate standard by which to assess 
potential applications of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), I 
nonetheless would conclude that application of the 
enhancement was warranted in this case.  
 
Applying its new test, the majority concludes that Bell’s 
conduct does not amount to physical restraint.  It determines 
that although Bell used physical force against the employee 
when Bell grabbed his neck and shoved him to the floor (factor 
(1)), the employee was not “left with no alternative but 
compliance . . . since [he] twice attempted to thwart the 
robbery” (factor (3)), and “there was no sustained focus on the 
victim” (factor (4)), as “the entire interaction . . . seems to have 
taken only seconds from start to finish.”  Maj. Op. 21–22.   
 
I must disagree with the majority’s conclusions as to the 
third and fourth factors, as well as its balancing of all of the 
factors.  As explained above, the employee’s attempts to 
interfere with the robbery should not preclude satisfaction of 
the no-alternative-but-compliance factor here because the 
enhancement aims to punish the act of physical restraint, 
successful or not.  See Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 182–83 (“It is 
the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining the victim . . . , 
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actual or threatened, that constitutes the action meriting 
enhancement of the offense level.”); see also United States v. 
Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting, in a case 
holding that psychological coercion is insufficient to warrant 
application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the “more general 
point” relayed by “the cases that have found physical restraint” 
is that the focus is “on the action of the defendant, not on the 
reaction of the victim,” and explaining that “the victim’s 
reaction does not determine whether there is or is not physical 
restraint”).   
 
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion regarding 
its fourth factor, assessing the duration of the restraint.  
Although I refrain from commenting on the propriety of 
adopting this factor — that is, whether the majority was correct 
to adopt the narrow view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in the circuit split on this issue — I believe that Bell’s 
conduct also satisfies this factor.  The majority concludes that 
it does not in part because “[i]t could not have taken more than 
a few seconds for Bell to grab the victim’s neck and shove him 
to the floor,” and therefore, “there was no sustained focus on 
the victim.”  Maj. Op. 22.4  But that was not the extent of Bell’s 
conduct — he also struck the employee when the employee 
attempted to interfere with the robbery.  In any event, it likely 
also took only moments for the robber in United States v. 
Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1048, 1050 (6th Cir. 2012), to order 
a bank employee at gunpoint to exit his “office adjacent to the 
bank lobby . . . and sit on the floor in the lobby,” yet the Court 
                                              
4 The record does not reveal how long the restraint 
lasted.  Bell claims it was “brief,” Reply Br. 3, or “very brief,” 
Bell Br. 8, while the Government suggests that “the restraint 
may have been short-lived,” Gov’t Br. 23. 
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that such conduct 
would satisfy the “sustained focus” standard adopted by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.5  In my view, the 
physical restraint need only last long enough “to facilitate 
commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.”  U.S.S.G. § 
2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  Here, it did the former, as Bell was able to 
grab money out of the cash register after shoving the employee 
to the ground. 
  
On balance, the factors in the majority’s newly 
proffered test weigh in favor of finding that Bell physically 
restrained the employee.  As the majority recognizes, he used 
physical force against the employee.  Next, Bell in fact 
restrained the employee — or “restrict[ed] [his] freedom of 
movement in some manner,” Maj. Op. 13 — when Bell 
grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, shoved him to the floor, 
and then hit him when he tried to interfere with the robbery.  
See United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that a “large and powerful” robber’s placement of 
a gun and “his hand on the victim’s neck and shoulder to force 
him into a kneeling position, especially while stating that ‘I do 
not want to hurt you,’ unquestionably qualifies as a ‘physical 
                                              
5 It appears to me that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s “sustained focus” standard might apply only when the 
conduct relied upon to prove physical restraint consists solely 
of issuing orders to victims at gunpoint rather than some sort 
of bodily contact with the victim, as here.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding, with “little doubt,” that “grabb[ing] a teller by her 
hair and pull[ing] her up from the floor . . . constitute[s] 
physical restraint,” but ordering a teller at gunpoint to get on 
the floor does not, absent a sustained focus on the teller).   
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restraint’ under any reasonable connotation of that term,” as it 
“diminish[ed] [his] freedom of movement and ability to resist 
or escape”).  Finally, the employee was restrained for enough 
time that Bell was able to steal $1,000 from the cash register.  
That this duration of time is adequate under the majority’s test 
would appear to be supported by a decision relied upon and 
quoted by the majority distinguishing a case where the victim 
was, as here, “held and threatened for a long enough period to 
accomplish the cash withdrawal.”  Maj. Op. 17 (quoting United 
States v. Mikalajunas, 936 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1991)).  
Based on this record, and reviewing this appeal using the 
majority’s new framework, I cannot conclude that the District 
Court clearly erred when it applied the physical restraint 
enhancement to Bell’s conduct and would therefore affirm 
application of that enhancement.6 
 
B. 
 
 I concur with the majority’s disposition of Bell’s appeal 
concerning application of the otherwise-use-of-a-dangerous-
weapon enhancement.  I only note that I would reach this same 
conclusion on a clear error review of the District Court’s 
sentence, as the record reveals that Bell was armed with a toy 
gun, which appeared to the employee to be a real gun until a 
part of it broke off, and that Bell pointed the gun at the 
employee’s neck, shoved him to the ground, and later struck 
him with the gun.7   
                                              
6 I would reach this same conclusion on a de novo 
review of the record.   
7 If the standard by which we review this issue were, 
indeed, de novo, I would concur with the majority’s conclusion 
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III. 
 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part.  
                                              
(and its reasoning therefore) that U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) 
applies to Bell’s conduct.   
